This blog aims to provide expert opinion and analysis on a wide range of issues relevant to the debate over Scotland's constitutional future, primarily but not exclusively from a legal perspective. The SCFF is not aligned with any political party or any particular position in the debate and posts will therefore express a variety of different points of view. If you would like respond to a particular post, or to submit a new topic for consideration, please email: contact@scottishconstitutionalfutures.org.
The early months of the 2014 independence referendum were dominated by process issues: who got to decide whether – and if so, on what terms – a referendum would take place? Following Nicola Sturgeon’s call on Monday for a second independence referendum, it looks like process issues will be equally problematic this time around.
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Referendums are supposed to provide decisive interventions in the affairs of state. They are designed to produce clear ‘yes or no’ answers to large political questions. And as these answers also come with a rare level of popular endorsement, this should facilitate their effective and timely implementation.
This is a reply to Iain Jamieson’s post which was itself a response to a post of ours discussing the significant changes to Scots landlord and tenant law contained in provisions of the ( then) Immigration Bill. Royal Assent to the Immigration Act 2016 (c.19)( the 2016 Act) has since been granted, and so the way is clear for the provisions under discussion to be implemented. Iain Jamieson’s post proceeds on the assumption that we consider that the enactment of these provisions without the consent of the Scottish Parliament constitutes a breach of the Sewel convention as currently understood.
It is at present uncertain whether the Sewel convention, which has now been put on a statutory footing by s. 2 of the Scotland Act 2016, will fall to be interpreted by a court in the same way as any other statutory provision (see my earlier post here). It is therefore opportune to consider how it might be interpreted.
The way in which the UK Government has given effect in section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016 to the recommendation of the Smith Commission that the Sewel convention should be put on a statutory footing gives rise to a number of difficult constitutional questions for the Scottish and UK Parliaments and Governments and the courts.
The Immigration Bill, which received its third reading in the House of Lords on Tuesday of this week (12/04/16), is a wide-ranging measure, running to 98 sections and 15 schedules ostensibly designed to make immigration control more effective. It included measures on, inter alia, the labour market, residential tenancies, bank accounts, driving licences and taxi licensing, enforcement powers of immigration officers, immigration detention and bail, and transfer of support for migrant children. The Immigration Bill and its precursor, the Immigration Act 2014, are of interest to constitutional lawyers for several reasons. This blog concentrates on one particular issue: the intrusions made by the Bill, and the 2014 Act which it amends, into the devolved competence of the Scottish Parliament ...
The critical choice for the Smith Commission and any subsequent political negotiations over devolution in Scotland and beyond, is between a Union based on a rationale of separation, where ‘sharing’ of power across the UK at Westminster will require to be justified on an on-going basis in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy; or a Union based on a rationale of sharing, which views the Union as existing because it encapsulates and can protect a set of common baseline values to which constituent parts of the Union subscribe to and have a stake in.
The victory for the No campaign in last week’s referendum means that, for the foreseeable future, Scotland will remain part of the United Kingdom, and that its (domestic) governance will continue to be split between Westminster and Holyrood. The result was a decisive one in that there was a clear margin of victory, achieved through a fair and legitimate process. However, the referendum is less decisive than some may have hoped for in two senses.
This is a copy of a blog post that was, in the event, not needed. My colleagues have told me that my writing has a calming, if not soporific, quality, and I thought that I should use this skill to good effect by preparing a post for publication in the event of a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum. The post was written at a time when it looked like the vote could go either way. Now, just a few days later, the context in which it was produced seems both foreign and remote. There is a temptation – which I have resisted – to modify its text in the light of hindsight. I’ve left it unaltered: it stands as an exercise in counter-factual constitutional history, an engagement with the constitution crisis that might have been.
Time is now running out for us all in the referendum debate, so I will keep this as short as I can. I hold many of the same views as my friends and colleagues Christine Bell and Aileen McHarg, both of whom have just posted on our common SCFF blog site detailed, well–argued and heart-felt cases for preferring the much-discussed uncertainties of ‘Yes’ to the newly minted uncertainties of the eleventh hour ‘Vow’ of Better Together.
With the Scottish referendum vote imminent, every issue of relevance to the debate on Scottish independence takes on crucial significance. In the context of Scotland’s EU membership, there has been a polarisation of approaches, which in the arena of politics is probably only to be expected.
The stated ambition of the Scottish Government is for an independent Scotland to be regulated by a central constitutional text; a “written constitution”. That was declared in its white paper of February 2013 ('Scotland's Future: from the Referendum to Independence and a Written Constitution') and further elaborated in its white paper of November 2013 ('Scotland's Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland'). The prevalent view seems to be that a constitutional code is necessary in the event of independence. That is, however, an assumption, and one that I seek to challenge.
The Scottish Government has recently announced its intention to introduce a draft Scottish Independence Bill into the Scottish Parliament which will set out an interim constitution for Scotland in the event of a Yes vote in September’s referendum. It will also describe the process by which a permanent written constitution will be drafted following the Scottish Parliament elections in 2016.
Referendums on constitutional change in Scotland produce ‘windows of opportunity’ to discuss the future of Scottish politics and policymaking. For example, the Scottish Constitutional Convention – an organization comprising political parties, interest groups, civic and religious leaders – formed in 1989 to promote the principle, and operation, of devolved government. It set much of the agenda during the devolution debates in the 1990s, promoting ‘new politics’, or widespread reform based on a rejection of political practices in ‘old Westminster’.
At the time the Edinburgh Agreement was signed, I argued that its most problematic aspect was the exclusion of a second question on further devolution; amongst other reasons, I thought that the question of what alternative constitutional futures for Scotland might be on offer would inevitably form part of the independence debate. So it has come to pass.
In a few months time Scotland will vote on independence. In my last post on the topic I discussed some of the consequences of a yes vote: the problems that would be raised around the currency, Scotland’s membership of the EU, and, more generally, the difficulties presented by the tight time-fame set by the Scottish Government for negotiation. That post should have given wavering ‘yes’ voters pause for thought; the path to independence is harder and riskier than the Scottish Government’s optimistic White Paper claims. In this post I will discuss one of the consequences of a no vote: its implications for subsequent independence referendums.
What happens if Scotland votes ‘no’ in September 2014? Would a re-examination of the constitutional structure of the UK be an important part of the reaction to the result of the independence referendum? And how would the future direction of any reform of the UK constitution be established? In thinking about such questions, the matter of how constitutional reform is undertaken in the UK (and indeed, to the UK) would fall to be considered. One mechanism for the evaluation of constitutional change which could feature prominently in such discussions is the constitutional convention.
As we know only too well, the Scottish Government’s current view, as set out in Scotland's Future, is that “The right time for a written constitution to be drafted is… after independence not before”. This has given rise to a concern that, in the event of a Yes vote in September “Good constitutional design, so essential to the health of a country, is likely to be forgotten in the rush” to address immediate practical needs, such as to organising the Armed Forces or issuing postage stamps. So what prospect is there for promoting desirable but less pressing elements of the constitutional architecture, such as a right to information?
As commentators we seem to end many of our contributions to the independence debate with the rather unhelpful conclusion that much remains, and will continue to remain, uncertain; a state of affairs accentuated by recent comments on the prospect of currency union and EU membership. This must frustrate those hardy souls who read to the end of our blogs seeking enlightenment. Perhaps then we owe readers an explanation as to why it is so hard to offer a clear picture of how an independent Scotland will be brought about and what it would look like.
Let me lay my cards on the table. I remain inclined to vote 'no' in September's referendum. I put it no stronger than 'inclined' in part because I believe, in the spirit of democracy - even democracy referendum-style - that those of us who have not signed the party pledge should keep an open mind as long as possible.
The UK government up until now has clearly stated that it is not going to ‘pre-negotiate’ the break up of the Union. Yet today the UK Chancellor George Osborne, along with support from the Labour and Liberal Democratic parties, has ruled out in advance a currency union.
In Moohan, Gibson and Gillon, Petitioners [2013] CSOH 199 the Court of Session ruled on the legality of the blanket ban on voting by prisoners in the independence referendum, rejecting the challenge brought to it by three disenfranchised offenders serving lengthy sentences.
Crisis and change make for more dramatic reading than continuity. Black and white scenarios are often politically expedient. But the seasoned EU observer is more familiar with the various shades of grey which characterise the complex and multiple relationships between the EU: and its member states; its neighbouring states and even not-so-near states; and of course with applicant and accession states at various stages of membership readiness.
Whilst the Scottish Government White Paper Scotland’s Future can be regarded as aspirational what it is lacking, in some respects, is legal and practical detail and, of course, the devil is always in the detail. One of the areas that would benefit from more specific input is that of social and economic rights.
The debate about the currency is now well underway in Scotland, although not as yet in the rest of the United Kingdom (UK) and so far most of the current contributors are paying little or no attention to the legal issues. Instead , they are mostly focusing on a combination of economic discussion and some wishful thinking.
At 650 pages Scotland’s Future is not a light read. It stands as the Scottish Government’s manifesto for a yes vote in the independence referendum. The volume ranges from profoundly important questions relating to currency and Scotland’s membership of the European Union, right down to weather-forecasting and the future of the National Lottery. Though it is likely many copies of Scotland’s Future will be printed, it is unlikely many will be read from cover to cover. Its authors probably do not regret its length: by its very heft, the volume seeks to rebut claims that the consequences of independence have not been carefully thought through. This post considers the immediate constitutional consequences of a yes vote in light of Scotland’s Future. Its central argument will be that the timescale proposed by the Scottish Government for independence following a referendum is unrealistic, and may work against the interests of an independent Scotland.
The white paper on Scotland’s Future (the “prospectus”) is silent on the subject of the regulation of magazines, newspapers, radio and television, almost as if the relevant sections had been removed.
The Scottish Government has set a date for independence, should it win the referendum, giving the period from 19 September 2014 to 23 March 2016 for the completion of the transition to an independent country and a full member state of the European Union and the OECD. In terms of the regulation of sectors of the Scottish economy it is a very tight schedule.
Were it to become independent, Scotland would have its own legal citizenship, and would in principle be free to define the circumstances in which that status was acquired. Scotland’s Future has added new detail concerning the content of Scotland’s citizenship law in the event of independence.
The White Paper affirms that ‘[f]ree education for those able to benefit from it is a core part of Scotland’s educational tradition and the values that underpin our educational system’ (p198). In that context, it is clearly stated that the Scottish Government would ‘continue to support access to higher education in Scotland for students from elsewhere in the EU in accordance with our support for student mobility across Europe’ (p200). On the previous page, however, the Government also asserts that it will ‘maintain the status quo by continuing our current policy of charging fees to students from the rest of the UK to study at Scottish higher education institutions’. It is difficult to see how these competing objectives can be reconciled under EU law.
Last week, I spent two days in London, accompanying a group of Constitutional Law students on a trip to the Westminster Parliament, the Supreme Court and the Scotland Office. The trip was part of a final year research project shadowing the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee’s Inquiry into The Constitutional Role of the Judiciary if there were a Codified Constitution.
Immigration is a reserved matter under the Scotland Acts, so independence would enable a Scottish Government to shape its own immigration policy for the first time. A short section in Chapter 7 of the White Paper promotes a more protection-oriented approach to asylum, and places managed migration more centrally than the UK Government does.
The Scottish Government’s White Paper on Scotland’s Future, published on 26th November 2013, includes a chapter on education, skills and employment, and has a particular focus on the university sector. The paper notes that ‘the university sector is one of the main drivers of the Scottish economy’, contributing to the economic, social and cultural welfare of the nation.
Chapter 4 of the Scottish Government’s Independence White Paper deals with health, wellbeing and social protection. This includes policy on pensions, social security benefits, housing, NHS and other health matters.
Would the vision of an independent Scotland as described in the White Paper Scotland’s Future be a fairer nation? The White Paper sets out some interesting commitments but leaves some important questions unanswered.
The independence white paper contains a number of significant policy pronouncements and legislative commitments in the field of employment rights and employment relations. Insofar as it relates to the world of work, the white paper is striking for its emphasis of greater substantive equality as a key policy goal, for its recognition of the importance of employees’ rights in achieving that goal, and for the stated readiness of the Government to commit itself to involving trade unions and employers in government, recognising ‘the positive role that can be played by collective bargaining’.
Should Scotland vote yes next September the legislation on independence would place a duty on the Scottish Parliament elected in 2016 to establish a constitutional convention to prepare a permanent written constitution for Scotland (Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland: p 332). There is understandable interest in what that constitution might say and how it might be made.
‘An independent Scotland will have an inclusive approach to citizenship’. So says the White Paper, and so said other earlier documents. That much we already knew. We know more now, in relation to the issues of birth, descent and residence, but there are still many gaps which need to be filled in.
The Scottish Government published its White Paper on Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland on Tuesday 26th November 2013 and the next day it published Scotland in the European Union.
Following the Edinburgh Agreement (in which the UK Government agreed to devolve the power to hold the referendum to the Scottish Government through a section 30 Order passed by the UK Parliament) the statutory framework for the referendum process has now been largely agreed by the Scottish Parliament and legislated for in the Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013 and the soon to be enacted Scottish Independence Referendum Bill which passed Stage 2 of the legislation process in the Scottish Parliament on 10 October 2013.
On 11 February this year the government of the United Kingdom took the highly unusual step of publishing the legal advice that they had commissioned on whether, in the event of Scottish independence, Scotland would be regarded in international law as a new state and the remainder of the UK as a continuation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
The UK Government’s Scotland Analysis series kicked off with very firm statements that the Residual UK (R.UK) would be the “continuator state” if Scotland became independent, and that Scotland would (almost certainly) have to (re)apply for membership of international organisations as a new state (UN, NATO, EU, etc.).
Even without the referendum campaign, we probably would – or, at least, should – have a debate about local democracy in Scotland. Less than 40% of the Scottish electorate bothered to vote in last year’s local council elections.
Defining citizenship status and allocating citizenship rights would be an independent Scotland’s ‘Who Do We Think We Are?’ moment, giving concrete form to the tricky question of ‘who are the Scots?’.
An SCFF event will take place in Aberdeen on Friday 11th October at 6pm to discuss one of the contested and important issues in the Scottish independence referendum – what would happen to Scotland’s membership of the European Union (EU) in the event of a “Yes” vote for Scottish independence in the referendum in September 2014?
And so the countdown begins. But the countdown to what? Twelve months from now we should know the result of the referendum, but just how significant a marker will that be on Scotland's constitutional journey?
The 2012 Hansard Audit of Political Engagement states: ‘Voters are disgruntled, disillusioned and disengaged’. After countless scandals, crises and inquiries, is it any wonder that people think politics isn’t working for them. At the Electoral Reform Society (ERS) Scotland, we believe that the Scottish independence referendum debate is an opportunity to challenge our political system to change, to confound the low expectations voters have of politics, and to deliver on the high hopes they still hold for democracy in Scotland.
The Scottish Government recently published Consumer Protection and Representation in an Independent Scotland: Options, setting out its vision for a new distinctively Scottish consumer protection, advocacy and redress regime, should Scotland vote for independence. The intention is to streamline and simplify the current complex and confusing consumer landscape, in order to better meet the needs of consumers in Scotland.
The referendum on independence is still a year away and already attention is focused on major substantive issues such as economic relations between an independent Scotland and the United Kingdom, and the ease or difficulty with which an independent Scotland would achieve membership of the European Union. What is often overlooked is that the credibility of the outcome of the vote on 18 September 2014, whatever that might be, will depend greatly on the legitimacy of the referendum process itself.
That we are currently engaged in a debate that will lead, next September, to a referendum on Scottish independence is wholly accidental: an anomalous quirk of electoral arithmetic, as unintended by the electorate as it was unforeseen by the parties who contested the Scottish Parliament general election on 5th May 2011.
Last month I posted a blog analysing the report of the Expert Working Group on Welfare appointed by the Scottish Government to review its work on the cost of benefit payments in an independent Scotland, and the delivery of benefit payments and to offer views on immediate priorities for change.
Three things happened to me this weekend. They seem related.
The first of the two Bills providing the statutory framework for the independence referendum has now been passed by the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Bill delineates the electorate for the referendum, offering up the Parliament’s vision of “the people” to be entrusted with taking the constitutional choice next year.
The future of the welfare state and, in particular, social security benefits could be a key issue in the independence referendum. Spending on state pensions and benefits is the largest item in the UK budget and would be the largest item in the budget of an independent Scotland. Taking over responsibility for pensions and benefits would also be the most complex administrative task facing a new Scottish Government.
I conceived this lecture in an attempt to stand back from the partisan hurly-burly surrounding the independence referendum. Instead it probes the nature of the British state from which nationalists want to separate (though not, it seems, entirely) and to which unionists want to cleave (though not, it seems, all that closely).
On 18 March and 1 May 2013, at the Scottish Parliament and Glasgow City Chambers respectively, the Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum (SCFF), Human Rights Consortium Scotland, Glasgow Human Rights Network, and Glasgow Refugee, Asylum and Migration Network came together at the Scottish Parliament to discuss the place of human rights and Scotland’s constitutional future; an issue which has been largely side-lined in the independence debate to date.
Together with Jim Gallagher and Guy Lodge, I have recently published Scotland’s Choices: the referendum and what happens afterwards (Edinburgh University Press, 2013).
The impact of constitutional change on environmental law in Scotland was the focus of an event held in Dundee as part of both the SCFF programme and the University of Dundee’s Five Million Questions project, a knowledge exchange programme aiming to inform the debate in the run-up to the referendum.
As the House of Lords Constitution Committee pointed out in its short report on what was then the Scotland Bill in 2011, while the devolutionary principle of Home Rule has now been accepted, indeed embraced, by all three of the UK’s main political parties, the consequences of devolution for Whitehall and Westminster continue to be unresolved.
I have never met Kenneth Roy, but have long been an admirer of his journalism. I am a Friend of the Scottish Review and sing its praises to any and all who will listen.
The debate over Scottish independence has turned recently to discussion of the post-referendum landscape. On 5 February the Scottish Government published Scotland's Future: from the Referendum to Independence and a Written Constitution which suggests that a two stage process would follow upon a majority Yes vote.
In a speech to the Foreign Press Association, First Minister Alex Salmond argued that an independent Scotland needs a written constitution in order to be a ‘modern state’.
At the fourth public event of the Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum, held at the University of Edinburgh School of Law on 27 February, Prof. Christine Bell and Prof. Neil Walker of the Law School discussed the constitutional process governing the forthcoming independence referendum of 2014.
On January 23, 2013 the Catalan Parliament adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty and Right to Decide of the Catalan People.[1] The Declaration proclaims ‘the people of Catalonia’ to be ‘a sovereign political and legal subject’ with a ‘right to decide … their collective political future’.
Debates leading up to the creation of the Scottish parliament demonstrated the huge potential to galvanise thinking about political change and the promotion of gender equality. However, women's voices and issues of gender equality and gender justice have been curiously absent from the current debates around constitutional futures in Scotland.
Devolution created a constitutional difficulty for the civil service in Scotland – it irrevocably split the loyalties of Her Majesty’s civil servants.
With the question now agreed for the Referendum, the Scottish Government published a plan on February 5th 2013 for what happens next – that is, between a Yes vote and the declaration of Independence in 2016. Significantly this outlines the parameters of drawing up a written constitution, a process that will begin post-independence.
Countries that are used to referendums on constitutional matters use them sparingly. The UK has no such constitutional requirement, but faces the possibility of having to deal with two such referendums within the space of a few years.
On Wednesday, the Electoral Commission published its much anticipated reports on the question to be asked in the 2014 independence referendum and on campaign spending limits.
Last week the Catalan Parliament adopted a ‘Declaration of Sovereignty of the Catalan People’, as the first step in its plan of ‘National Transition’, leading up to the holding of a referendum on the constitutional future of Catalonia in 2014.
The European Union dimension of the coming Scottish Independence debate is perhaps best approached by asking:
On 18 January, the Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum held its second public event – a seminar at the University of Strathclyde on Energy Policy and Constitutional Change.
In this post I have tried to set out my analysis of the position in European Union law if there is a vote in favour of Scottish independence in the 2014 referendum.
In 2007 the Scottish Government launched the National Conversation. This was an exercise to get people talking about independence. Although things have moved on quite a bit since then, it’s worth noting that the Scottish Government has achieved one of its objectives. We’re all discussing Scotland’s constitutional future in a way we were not a decade ago.
The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) has in the past two weeks appointed seven one year senior fellowships with overall funding of £1.3 million.
One of the key questions in the EU segment of the constitutional debate in Scotland is whether an independent Scotland could be required, under EU law, to adopt the Euro as its currency against the wishes of its government.
Giving evidence to the Scottish Parliament’s Referendum (Scotland) Bill Committee on the draft section 30 Order this morning, I was struck by the number of questions from the Committee about the precise legal effects of the Memorandum of Agreement between the UK and Scottish Government and of the section 30 Order.
On Monday 15 October 2012, the Prime Minister of the UK government and the First Minister of the Scottish Parliament, publicly signed in a formal ceremony a document entitled simply ‘Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on an Independence Referendum for Scotland, now known colloquially (in Scotland at least) as the ‘Edinburgh Agreement’ ...
The advice of the Scottish Law Officers may have become highly conspicuous by its absence in recent days, but over the years other prominent figures, including some excellent legal minds, have offered their considered opinion on the implications of Scottish independence for EU membership.
The crucial question over the next two years is a superficially simple one: “What does ‘Scotland as an independent country’ mean”?
Yesterday, David Cameron and Alex Salmond signed an historic Memorandum of Agreement on a Referendum on Independence for Scotland (MoA), which includes the text of a draft Order under section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998 to confer express powers on the Scottish Parliament to enact legislation authorising such a referendum.
Typical. You wait ages for one regional parliament to call for a referendum, then two come along at once. Scotland’s own path towards a referendum can now be compared to Catalonia’s call for an independence plebiscite. Self determination must be contagious, but the international law doctrine of self-determination is an angle that has been overlooked at times in the independence debate.
The debate about Scotland’s constitutional future promises to be a debate about more powers for the Scottish Parliament, be it in the form of an independent Scotland, ‘independence-lite’, ‘devo-max’ or however else we want to describe our vision of the promised land.
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